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The right to community?
Legal geographies of resistance on
London’s gentrification frontiers
Phil Hubbard and Loretta Lees
Displacement is central to the process of gentrification, but the importance of law in both
enacting and resisting such displacement is often overlooked. Noting the tensions between
existential, embodied meanings of displacement (i.e. being removed from a place called
home), and the formal legal definitions of displacement (i.e. the removal of the right to a
property), this paper explores how the law is implicated in the struggle for London’s remain-
ing council estates, with processes of expropriation providing councils a means of displacing
residents from these estates to allow for (private) redevelopment but also an opportunity for
residents to assert their ‘right to community’. Here, we focus on the implications of the UK
Secretary of State’s decision not to overturn the Planning Inspectorate’s (2016) recommen-
dation that Southwark Council should not be allowed to compulsory purchase those homes
on the Aylesbury Estate which residents had not already vacated via negotiation. This
decision was reached on the basis that while tenants would be compensated financially
for the loss of property, they would not be adequately compensated for losing their home.
This is suggestive of an expanded notion of housing rights that encompasses a right to com-
munity—something that raises the possibility of the law actually aligning with the interests
of council residents rather than supporting the politics of gentrification.
Key words: gentrification, displacement, resistance, right to the city, legal geographies, London
Introduction
R
esistance has been a recurrent theme
in gentrification studies (Annun-
ziata and Rivas-Alonso, forthcom-
ing), but exploration of how the law is
used as a resource by those fighting for
the ‘right to remain’ has been surprisingly
limited. Instead, both critical urban scho-
lars and the media alike have often
focused on instances of squatting (e.g.
Annunziata and Lees 2016; Martı´nez and
Cattaneo 2016; NION 2010), social and
bodily resistance (e.g. Drissel 2011) or
‘everyday activism’ (e.g. Chatterton and
Pickerill 2010; Lees, Annunziata, and
Rivas-Alonso, forthcoming). In many
senses, this focus is understandable given
grassroots organisations often lack the
resources necessary to mount a legal chal-
lenge to processes of (state-sponsored) gen-
trification, and tactics of occupation and
non-profit organising have often proved
effective in terms of drawing attention to
the plight of those living on gentrification
frontiers (see City 2016). While the con-
struction of temporary, autonomous and
nomadic spaces of resistance is then an
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important tactic for drawing attention to
particular struggles for place, important
legal battles being fought by residents and
their supporters rarely get a mention even
when there have been significant wins.
Given Chester Hartman’s (1984) influen-
tial writing on the different ways that a
community might fight legally for their
‘right to stay put’, this is a significant
omission.
The invocation of the ‘right to stay put’ is
significant here given that, in recent years,
responses to neoliberal urbanism and spatial
injustice have frequently been framed in
terms of the ‘right to the city’ (Aalbers and
Gibb 2014). In Lefebvre’s (1996, 158) original
formation this involved both an abstract
claim to city life, as well as a concrete claim
to the facilities that should be shared by all
urban dwellers, such as spaces of work,
leisure, education, healthcare and accommo-
dation. Developing this, Purcell (2002)
argues that all those who inhabit cities
should have the right to participate in the
production of the city, suggesting it is not
only ‘keyworkers’ like nurses, teachers and
firefighters who should enjoy full rights to
the city, but also those cleaners, security
staff, and domestic workers who keep
global cities running but whom appear rela-
tively powerless compared with the corpor-
ate developers who routinely profit from
‘accumulation through dispossession’
(Harvey 2003). In this light, arguing for ‘the
right to the city’ has been identified as a call
to transform the power relations that underlie
the production of space, fundamentally shift-
ing control away from capital and towards
citizens (Merrifield 2011).
But what is often forgotten in such debates
is that, strictly speaking, rights to the city are
legal in character: they only apply if they are
upheld by some authority or other. These
authorities have different jurisdictions, and
can operate on different scales simul-
taneously, meaning that at times it is not
clear which rights take precedence: for
example, rights to freedom and self-
expression are enshrined into international
treaties and agreements (e.g. the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, drawn up by
the UN in 1948) but in Western democracies
municipal law continues to play a crucial role
in mediating and shaping these (Attoh 2011).
Here, municipal law denotes the range of
planning regulations, land use zoning instru-
ments, environmental policies and building
codes designed to ensure urban ‘orderliness’
(Hubbard 2015; Valverde 2016). These
shape rights to the city in significant, but
often unacknowledged, ways. For example,
legally zoning the (modern) city into distinct
areas reserved for retail, industrial and resi-
dential land uses places limits on the range
of possible functions that a space might
fulfil. Likewise, municipal law can reproduce
or challenge the right to property through
development control regulations that con-
strain the production of space by particular
populations, ostensibly when this is in the
wider urban interest (e.g. removing those
squatting on land owned by others, or pre-
venting particular forms of self-build which
do not meet required standards). Likewise,
forceful expropriation can be understood as
an action that involves housing and land
belonging to a particular group being taken
for public use or benefit. In this context, the
right to inhabit the city is guaranteed for all
those who legally occupy land, but is a right
frequently undermined with reference to the
public good. Legal mechanisms are hence
integral to the displacement of people from
land that is deemed worthy of redevelop-
ment, with the local ‘entrepreneurial’ state
seemingly able to deploy legal powers with
impunity as it pursues agonistic policies pre-
dicated on large-scale displacement and gen-
trification (Baeten and Listerborn 2015;
Delaney 2004).
This implies that there is a need for a codi-
fication of urban rights in which the ‘right to
remain’ becomes a central dimension of the
contract between state and citizen, offering
the latter some ability to resist attempts to
overwrite individual rights to occupy, dwell
and transform urban space. Lefebvre would
have no doubt been uncomfortable with the
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idea that the right to the city could ever be
translated into enforceable legal rights given
his conception favoured use over exchange
(and hence customary over contractual law).
As Purcell has argued:
‘For Lefebvre a right is not an end goal that
we can reach when the state inscribes it into
law. Instead for him a right is a beginning. It is
a political opening statement, a point of
departure from which we begin a generalized
struggle for a thoroughgoing renewal of
political life . . . Instead he thinks of the right
as a ‘cry and demand’’ (Purcell 2013, 316–7)
There are then dangers in proposing that the
right to the city could ever be formulated in
legalistic terms, or translated into legally
enforceable rights by state-centric insti-
tutions. This noted, there are many commen-
tators who nonetheless believe that the right
to the city idea can usefully drive legal and
institutional reform in ways that begin to
support broadly progressive agendas (e.g.
Attoh 2011; Brown 2013; Butler 2012).
Whether one regards legal reform as a
beginning or an end in terms of realising the
right to the city depends on how one con-
ceives of the role of the law in the exercise
of state power (see Gill 2010; Jessop 2007).
On the one hand, there is a view that there
is a fundamental disconnect between pro-
gressive publics and the state, and that the
law tends to support extractive, exclusionary
and coercive state policies. This is certainly a
key thematic in legal geographies, especially
work addressing property relations in the
capitalist city (e.g. Blomley 2010; Cunning-
ham 2008), including several studies which
directly trace the legal mechanisms support-
ing spatial exclusion and dispossession (e.g.
Delaney 2004; Hodkinson and Essen 2015).
Such analyses tend to present the law as an
appendage of state power, detailing the dis-
tinctive legal practices and apparatus associ-
ated with statist institutions (legislatures,
international organisations, administrative
agencies, courts, the police, and so on). But
within legal geography there is also an inter-
est in non-state actors, events, and legal
expressions such as forms of ‘ordinary’ legal
consciousness, customary laws and norms
(Hubbard and Prior 2017). Lawyers interpret
and weigh up these laws in different spatial
contexts, sometimes reinforcing spatial
norms, at other times altering them (Martin,
Scherr, and City 2010). Arguably, this
implies the need for analysis of how law is
being applied to different situations, places
or issues in situ, allowing publics and states
to fuse and attach to one another in some-
times surprising ways (Cooper 2016). This
requires consideration not of abstract prin-
ciples but law in action: analysis not of law
in general—as if it exists as a single entity—
but study of the way that laws are enacted
differently in different jurisdictions, some-
times clashing with laws enacted at other
scales (Valverde 2016).
Recognising the law as a realm of compet-
ing interests, ideologies, and capacities
(Delaney 2015), this paper explores how the
law constructs differential or even contradic-
tory rights to the city. It does this in relation
to the legal processes enabling private develo-
pers and corporations to push London’s gen-
trification frontier into council estates by
breaking up and displacing low income and
working class communities. At first glance,
legal processes such as stock transfer and
compulsory purchase appear to act unilater-
ally in the interests of corporate developers
wishing to develop housing to be sold at a
market rate rather than provide ‘affordable’
or social housing (see Hodkinson and Essen
2015; Watt 2009). But this paper insists such
processes are inevitably also a realm of con-
testation, providing a space where residents
can present arguments about their right to
stay put. While such legal challenges have
(to date) been largely unsuccessful, costly
and time-consuming, there have been some
glimmers of light in recent legal adjudica-
tions, with emerging signs that the law
might be able to align state and institutional
power with what Delaney (2016, 269) terms
‘vectors of justice’, offering a means by
which displacement might be legally resisted
(see also Bryant and McGee 1983). In
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discussing these possible alignments, we
describe the way that rights to the city can
be mobilised, suggesting that arguments for
the right to housing need to be transformed
into a more consequential legal claim to the
right to community.
The London clearances
Against a backdrop of rising homelessness in
the UK, and increasing demand for afford-
able housing in the capital, London’s
council estates are currently experiencing a
‘new’ wave of urban renewal (Lees 2014a).
This state-led redevelopment, enabled by
local (borough) councils, has been instigated
by national and regional policies favouring
the involvement of private finance in the
upgrading of council estates. To ‘kick-start
and accelerate’ that process, the Tory govern-
ment has launched a £150 million Estate
Regeneration Programme of loans to private
developers for ‘redeveloping existing estates’
on ‘a mixed tenure basis’ (HCA 2014), conti-
nuing New Labour’s mixed-community
policy (see Bridge, Butler, and Lees 2011;
Lees 2008). More recently, the Mayor of
London’s (2014, 59) Housing Strategy has
similarly called for the ‘vast development
potential in London’s existing affordable
housing estates’ to be unlocked through
private redevelopment. While this means
that state assets are being ceded to the
private sector, this is defended with reference
to the need to increase the overall housing
supply via densification of those estates.
The London Assembly (2015, 14) estimated
that 50 former council estates across London
received planning permission for partial or
complete demolition and redevelopment
between 2005 and 2015, a figure that rises to
131 if one considers all council estates of
more than 100 residents that have experienced
decanting and demolition since the beginnings
of New Labour’s programme of ‘urban renais-
sance’.1 Though there are some significant
differences between Conservative and New
Labour’s urban policies, this suggests estates
remain a significant focus for redevelopment.
In December 2016 the Department for Com-
munities and Local Government announced
an additional £172 m of pump-priming
funding for such schemes, arguing:
‘Estate regeneration can transform
neighbourhoods by delivering well designed
housing and public space, a better quality of
life and new opportunities for residents. It
provides an opportunity both to improve
housing for existing residents and to provide
much needed new homes, particularly in
urban areas, where estates have been built at
relatively low densities. We believe estate
regeneration has the potential to deliver
thousands of net additional homes over the
next 10 to 15 years’ (DCLG 2016, 4)
However, recent policy missives acknowl-
edge the need to engage with, and protect,
existing estate residents, responding in part
to concerns about the impact of estate redeve-
lopment on existing communities. The
DCLG’s (2016) Estate Regeneration
National Strategy: Resident Engagement
and Protection demands ‘more than legal’
protections for council estate residents:
‘It is a legal requirement for leaseholders to be
compensated if their home is demolished.
However, we expect that schemes will go
further and offer leaseholders a package that
enables them to stay on the estate or close by.
We also expect leaseholders to be offered the
option of an independent valuation of their
property’ (DCLG 2016, 5)
Later in the same year the GLA (2016) pub-
lished its Draft Good Practice Guide to
Estate Regeneration. Following Sadiq
Khan’s pre-election pledge to increase the
proportion of London’s homes that are
affordable, this guide reiterates the many
advantages that can be associated with estate
regeneration—better quality homes and
neighbourhoods, and also new and affordable
homes—but notes the potentially disruptive
effects of regeneration on existing commu-
nities and neighbourhoods, setting forth prin-
ciples for resident-led regeneration:
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‘The Mayor believes that for estate
regeneration to be a success, there must be
resident support for proposals, based on full
and transparent consultation. These proposals
should offer full rights to return for displaced
tenants and a fair deal for leaseholders, and
demolition should only be followed where it
does not result in a loss of social housing, or
where all other options have been exhausted’
(GLA 2016, 4)
This allusion to the right to return is impor-
tant, suggesting that:
‘landlords should offer tenants who have to
move off the estate while works are underway
a full right to return to a property of a suitable
size, at the same or similar level of rent, the
same level of security of tenure and with the
appropriate design features’ (GLA 2016, 12)
However, there are notable caveats here (such
as the fact that local authorities are phasing
out lifelong tenancies, and that they may
not be able to offer similar housing because
of changes to the housing mix), and until
the final version of this report is published
it is not clear how significant this guidance
might ultimately be in combatting the signifi-
cant population displacements associated
with estate renewal (see Lees 2014b; LTF
et al. 2014; see Figures 1 & 2).
The notion of ‘social cleansing’ has hence
been invoked to describe estate renewal in
London (see Lees 2014b).2 This ‘domicide’
(Porteous and Smith 2001) involves both the
short-term removal of tenants and lease-
holders to allow for estate redevelopment,
as well as the longer-term out-migration of
residents for whom the estate begins to be
less attractive and affordable as a place to
live because of the influx of more affluent
households (see also Elmer and Dening
2016; Hodkinson and Essen 2015; Watt
2016). This implicates estate regeneration
within the wider processes of gentrification
in the capital which, accompanied by auster-
ity urbanism and welfare benefit reforms (e.g.
the bedroom tax, the capping of local housing
allowance, changes in eligibility for housing
benefit for the under 35s and so on), are
breaking up working class communities
which are often long-standing and character-
ised by forms of social and cultural capital
that can compensate for a lack of economic
prosperity (Lees 2008; Lees and White,
under review). The latter is particularly
emphasised in the campaigns led by some
resident groups and estates against displace-
ment, including those campaigns which have
invoked the ‘right to stay put’ (see Lees and
Ferreri 2016; LTF et al. 2014).
The legalities of displacement: compulsory
purchase orders in London
Estate renewal is part of a process some have
equated to a form of ‘accumulation by dispos-
session’ (Harvey 2003), given it involves a
release of common and state-assets to the
market that demands the direct displacement
of some, or all, existing residents. Irrespective
that redeveloped estates might retain significant
amounts of social—but rarely council—
housing, the redevelopment requires displace-
ment so that existing housing can be demol-
ished, refurbished or densified, with the
payoff for the developers being the opportu-
nity to develop speculative private housing
aimed at upper middle class consumers. For
some this signifies not just the dismantling of
low income or working class communities,
but the end of council estates as we know them:
‘The policy of demolishing London’s housing
estates is . . . the keystone in this
Government’s crusade to dismantle the
welfare state built by Labour after the Second
World War . . . To this end, not only must the
greatest source of working-class housing in
London be reduced to rubble and their often
significantly lower quality replacements
priced at a level few Londoners—let alone
working- class Londoners—will be able to
afford, but the very idea of council housing
must become impossible to conceive again’
(Elmer and Dening 2016, 275)
Given the potentially far-reaching conse-
quences of the ‘London clearances’, Hodkin-
son and Essen (2015) suggest there is
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surprisingly little written about the legal
mechanisms through which this disposses-
sion is occurring. However, as their analysis
of the Myatts Field North Estate in
Lambeth shows, there is a reliance on
certain formal legal mechanisms to bring
council estates within circuits of capital
accumulation, with specific processes of com-
pulsory purchase, tenure renegotiation and
master-planning required to ensure the tran-
sition from a council or social housing associ-
ation-run estate to a mixed tenure estate
redeveloped and run by a private provider.
A key mechanism here is the Compulsory
Purchase Order (a form of expropriation)
(Lees and Ferreri 2016; Winter and Lloyd
2006). CPOs represent the main means
through which a London borough can make
an estate available for private sector redeve-
lopment and densification (or, in the terms
in which CPOs are usually framed, more
‘productive use’).3 Layard (forthcoming)
suggests CPOs are difficult and time consum-
ing for local authorities to pursue: this said,
they are also difficult to challenge. Davis
and Thornley’s (2010) analysis of the use of
CPOs in the regeneration near the 2012
Olympic site in the Lower Lea Valley area
demonstrates this:
‘A public Inquiry was held in order to
determine the CPO. This was a full year after
the [Olympic] bid had been won. This
provided the opportunity for objections to a
CPO – which affected groups had a legal
right to make – to be formally ‘heard’. The
ultimate decision rested with the Secretary of
State for Communities and Local
Government. In a bid to minimise the number
of representations at the hearing, the LDA
accelerated its negotiation processes with
land-owners, producing ‘a flurry of eleventh
hour relocation deals’. By the time the hearing
commenced, 90% of the land was in the
LDA’s possession and 70% of the jobs on the
Figure 1 Council tenant displacement from the Aylesbury Estate (Source: Public Inquiry, Aylesbury Estate, London, Wit-
ness Statement Professor Loretta Lees, 29th April 2015)
HUBBARD AND LEES: THE RIGHT TO COMMUNITY? 13
site safeguarded . . . leaving a relatively small
number of individuals objecting to the terms
of relocation or to the CPO itself’ (Davis and
Thornley 2010, 93)
There were three legal challenges to the above
CPO; all of which were unsuccessful. In each
case the Judge decided that although there
had been substantial interference to the clai-
mant’s human rights, the importance of the
Olympics and its legacy was overwhelming.4
Those unable to overturn the CPO included
424 tenants on the Clays Lane Estate
(Newham), the majority of whom were relo-
cated to East London’s outer boroughs
(Waltham Forest and Barking & Dagenham),
away from the more central locations they
had previously resided in (Bernstock 2014;
see also Hatcher 2012).
This suggests that although estate regener-
ation may begin from a position of negotiation
between the local authority, developers and
existing tenants, leaseholders and freeholders,
for individual residents, many things seem
non-negotiable. So although the council has
an obligation to ensure that a property
owner is no better or worse off after a CPO
(with home-loss payments typically set at
10% of the market value of a property),
attempts to broker a fair deal, or exert the
‘right to remain’ seem destined to fail given
the local state usually emerges victorious in
‘facilitative’ law disputes because of its vested
‘authority’ (Blandy and Wang 2013). This is
something that sometimes appears inevitable
in relation to CPOs:
‘Legal and procedural rights of owners in a
CPO process are a mirage: they evaporate
upon arrival at the point they might be
wielded. This is more than a procedural and
practical problem. It is also a marker of the
open-ness and non-materialisation of the law,
for subjects stand in anticipation of a law that
Figure 2 Leaseholder displacement from the Aylesbury Estate (Source: Public Inquiry, Aylesbury Estate, London, Witness
Statement Professor Loretta Lees, 29th April 2015)
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is always deferred in a ‘zone of indistinction’
and made subject to the sovereign decision’
(Gray and Porter 2015, 383)
In short, the law seems tipped in favour of the
private developers, whom the state assist in
acquiring land (see also Thomas and Imrie
1989). The law appears to offer little right
to remain: citizens that stand in the way of
re-development are displaced by an effective
suspension of the legal norms that ordinarily
prioritise the right to property (see also Gray
and Porter 2015, on Glasgow’s Common-
wealth Games clearances).
This said, the CPOs surrounding sports
mega-events could be considered as occur-
ring in a state of exception, and at a
moment when a strong claim is being made
to a wider, if obscure, public interest. But in
the context of London’s housing crisis, the
de facto designation of all London’s council
estates as brownfield public land (or ‘brown-
field estates’)5 has consolidated the idea that
CPOs are a legally defensible technique for
displacing residents from occupied land in
the interests of solving the capital’s housing
crisis (via a strategy of densification that
involves building at higher density on exist-
ing estates). Nationally, the number of
CPOs served annually are relatively few—
e.g. less than 80 in 2012—but nearly all of
the estate redevelopment schemes in
London pursued in the last decade or so
have involved a compulsory purchase order,
usually, and ironically, to displace those lea-
seholders who bought their property under
the much-critiqued Right to Buy scheme.
Indeed, only council estate freeholders or lea-
seholders have the statutory right to object to
compulsory purchase, not council tenants:
the latter are simply offered housing
elsewhere.6
The now-demolished Heygate Estate in
Southwark provides a notable example of the
use of such CPO powers, being one of the
first council estates in London to fight this
‘new’ form of urban renewal at a CPO
public inquiry in 2013. This was the grand
finale in a long-running campaign of resistance
to the redevelopment of the Heygate Estate
and wider Elephant and Castle area (Lees
2014b; Lees and Ferreri 2016). When a CPO
was served on Heygate leaseholders in 2012
they exercised their right to object. Their argu-
ment was two-fold: firstly, they objected to
the unfair valuation of their properties (at
half of the borough average price per square
foot), which would mean they would be per-
manently priced out of central London, and,
secondly, they argued the development pro-
posals were not in the public interest, as they
would create ‘a private gated high-rise
citadel’. As Lees and Ferreri describe, the
Public Inquiry ran over four days in February
2013 and involved the objectors and a range of
expert witnesses7 who presented a broad cri-
tique of the redevelopment scheme:
‘The Public Inquiry reproduced the three
modes of resistance and collective positions
from which organizing and resistance had
been articulated in and around the estate in its
last three years: from exposing the ‘broken
promises’ of the regeneration scheme, to
making the process of enforced relocation
visible to the general public, to raising the
question of the wider repercussions and
future displacements to be caused by the
demolition of low-income public housing,
not just in the neighbourhood, but also in the
borough and London at large’ (Lees and
Ferreri 2016, 21)
Criticisms of the future provision of ‘afford-
able housing’ on site, particularly the higher
levels of rent compared to those previously
available to council tenants, was declared by
the Heygate CPO Planning Inspector,
Wendy Fabian, as ‘a matter of wider social
policy consideration, not unique to the Order
Land [the area of the Heygate Estate still
inhabited] or this CPO’ (Fabian 2013, 31).
Nevertheless, the scheme was deemed compli-
ant with the affordability levels defined by the
Council and the GLA, and the CPO was con-
firmed. While ultimately unsuccessful, the
Inquiry was arguably useful in terms of
making the local authority provide a legal jus-
tification for its actions, and provided a useful
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test bed for those who subsequently objected
to the adjacent Aylesbury Estate CPOs.
The Aylesbury Estate CPO Public Inquiry:
a winning precedent?
The Aylesbury Estate Public Inquiry was
prompted by the Aylesbury Leaseholder’s
Action Group, consisting of eleven lease-
holders in eight properties earmarked for
demolition across four blocks which South-
wark Council wanted to give to Notting
Hill Housing Trust to be demolished and
redeveloped.8 Ten qualifying objections and
one non-qualifying objection to the CPO
were received prior to the commencement
of the inquiry which took place 30 April,
1–2 May, 12 May and 13–15 October 2015,
overseen by the Planning Inspector, Lesley
Coffey. Several additional objections were
made at the inquiry. These related to the
failure of the scheme to ensure that social
rented housing would be provided; the deli-
verability of the scheme; the failure to
explore refurbishment as an alternative to
demolition; the lack of guarantees that the
scheme would promote the social well-
being of the area; the failure of the Acquiring
Authority to carry out an Equality Impact
Assessment in relation to the leaseholders;
and the suggestion that the CPO breached
the human rights of the leaseholders.9
Following the Inquiry, the inspector rec-
ommended the CPO should not be con-
firmed because, although the scheme was in
accordance with the planning framework
for the area, and there was no viable alterna-
tive to the scheme, overall there would be too
many negative impacts meaning that ‘a com-
pelling case in the public interest [had] not
been proved’.10 The Secretary of State for
Communities and Local Government’s 2016
(initial) decision to confirm this recommen-
dation hence represented a significant and
surprising victory for the leaseholders and
others involved.11 The key reasons given by
the Secretary of State for his decision were
that there had been insufficient negotiation
with remaining leaseholders; that Southwark
Council had not taken reasonable steps to
acquire land interests by agreement; that
there would be considerable economic,
social and environmental disbenefits for the
leaseholders who would remain on the land;
that interference with the human rights of
those with an interest in the relevant land
was not sufficiently justified; and overall,
that the test for a ‘compelling case in the
public interest’ had not been met
(as required by CPO policy guidance).
This decision stressed the importance of
addressing human rights when individuals
are affected by a CPO (i.e. Article 8 of the
ECHR right to respect ‘private and family
life’). It also highlighted the increasing
importance of Public Sector Equality Duty
in England and Wales given the suggestion
in the ruling that black and ethnic minority
residents would be ‘disproportionately
affected’ by the CPO, and that it would
have a negative impact on their ability to
retain their cultural ties.12 Issues such as
the ‘dislocation from family life’ and the
potential to harm the education of affected
children were also identified in the decision
letter, indicating a much wider approach to
assessing the impacts of a CPO than had
been the case previously. In the Secretary of
State’s summation:
‘The options for most leaseholders are either
to leave the area, or to invest the majority of
their savings in a new property. Article 8(1)
. . . is therefore clearly engaged. In relation to
Article 8(2) (which permits interference
which is proportionate when balanced against
the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others), the Secretary of State finds that the
interference with residents’ (in particular
leaseholders’) Article 8 rights is not
demonstrably necessary or proportionate,
taking into account the likelihood that if the
scheme is approved, it will probably force
many of those concerned to move from this
area . . . The likelihood that leaseholders will
have to move away from the area will result in
consequential impacts to family life and, for
example, the dislocation from local family,
the education of affected children and,
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potentially, dislocation from their cultural
heritage for some residents.’13
The letter went on to note ‘the lack of clear
evidence regarding the ethnic and/or age
make-up of those who now remain resident
at the Estate and who are therefore actually
affected by any decision to reject or confirm
the Order’, but argued that given that ‘67%
of the population living on the Estate were
of BME origin’ it would be highly likely
that there would be a disproportionate
impact of the CPO on the elderly and chil-
dren from these groups. It was argued that
black residents would be especially affected
if the Order were confirmed. The Secretary
of State noted that:
‘white British culture is more widely-
established across the UK, including at
housing sites to which residents may be
moved, whereas minority cultural centres are
often less widespread, which is likely to make
cultural integration harder for those of BME
origin who are forced to move than those of a
white British origin.’
The CPO decision was significant and it has
raised Aylesbury residents’ (and residents
on other council estates across London)
expectations that they might be able to
remain in their homes. The decision fell
short of stating that there is an absolute
‘right to a community’ but its implications
will clearly be a significant factor in future
CPO decisions in London, not least where
renewal threatens estates where BME resi-
dents are present in significant numbers
(White and Morton 2016).
From the right to housing to the right to
community?
The proposed redevelopment of the Ayles-
bury Estate is not untypical of the estate
schemes ongoing in many parts of London
which involve the forcible eviction of existing
populations. Such displacements might nor-
mally be deemed indefensible were such
redevelopment not deemed essential to
increase the overall amount of housing in
the capital: in the case of the Aylesbury
Estate, 2,758 homes are to be replaced by
4,900 units of a variety of sizes and tenures
to allow for the development of a new
‘mixed community’. But with only 1,473
social housing units promised (i.e. not
council housing and at a higher rent), and
the majority sold at market-rate, this suggests
that the social composition of the area will
change considerably, and long-term out-
migration and displacement will be inevita-
ble. This displacement of leaseholders and
tenants via agreement, and if necessary, a
CPO, is something that is generally seen as
being in the public interest given the
demand for new housing in London, irre-
spective of the fact that what is being demol-
ished is much sought-after and often
structurally-sound council housing (Lees
2014a).
In campaigns against such removal, the
right to the city appears to translate into a
narrower but arguably more concrete claim,
namely the right of residents to continue to
occupy their homes. This right to housing is
one that is much invoked in gentrification
struggles. As Rolnick (2014, 294) argues,
‘a crucial point of convergence between
different [urban] struggles . . . is the central
role of housing: displacements, evictions,
threats on security of tenure of urban
dwellers, the right to be an integral part of the
decision-making process of defining the
destiny of urban spaces and mostly the
political links between ‘place’, ‘condition of
inhabitants’ and citizenship rights are in the
core of all ‘right to the city’ urban struggles.’
Alkhalili, Dajani, and De Leo (2014: 9) put it
more succinctly, arguing that ‘the right to the
city cannot be maintained if the right to
housing is missing’.
In the face of the current housing crisis in
England and Wales, there is now mounting
legal and public pressure for the ‘right to
housing’ to be enshrined in legislation:
although the Housing Act 1966 suggests all
citizens have a right to suitable housing, in
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practice this translates merely to a right to
some form of accommodation. However, in
the case of the Aylesbury Estate, residents
resisted the CPO not on the basis that they
will lack accommodation per se but that
they need a suitable living environment (see
also Hartman 1998). This noted, the Ayles-
bury resistance has been a long struggle, and
one that has involved the voluntary labour
of many residents, advocates and supporters,
as well as the use of crowdfunding to get
expert legal advice. For leaseholders the
Aylesbury CPO decision provides a basis
for re-negotiation of compensation and a
‘London market value promise’ which
means that they are ultimately given enough
money (with no increase in mortgage or
new service charges) to be able to afford to
buy the same kind of property on the regen-
erated estate.14 Details of the amounts paid
by Southwark for homes on the Aylesbury
Estate were obtained by campaigners under
FOI showing low offers being made and
accepted under the threat of compulsory pur-
chase. In September 2012, for example,
Southwark council paid one leaseholder on
the Aylesbury Estate just £75,000 for
their large, 47 m2, one-bedroom flat. In
2014 the council paid £147,500 for a four-
bedroom, 97 m2 maisonette. To put this in
context, by January 2013, average house
prices in London had already hit £400,000
and in 2017 a four-bed duplex in the Ayles-
bury’s newly-built Harvard Gardens cost
£795,000.
The fact that Aylesbury leaseholders
fought for the right to remain is highly sig-
nificant. In previous CPO public inquiries,
the planning inspector has usually been
happy to uphold the CPO if it appears no-
one will become homeless.15 The Aylesbury
decision suggests a potential shift, and an
expanded notion of the right to housing
being accepted: it implies it is not simply
enough for people to be rehoused, but that
they need to be rehoused in a suitable
environment where they can rebuild a sense
of community. This is akin to the widened
conception of the right to housing argued
for by Marcuse and Madden (2016, 144),
who suggest that ‘the way forward is to
acknowledge the limits of formal rights to
housing under the current legal and political
system while at the same time pressing for a
sufficiently broad, activist conception of
those rights’ as only this approach can chal-
lenge ‘residential commodification, alien-
ation, oppression, and inequality’.
For Marcuse and Madden, this expanded
or radical right to housing is hence one that
recognises the right to a home and to a com-
munity, not just housing per se:
‘People do not only live in homes. They live
in neighborhoods and communities. They
occupy buildings but also locations in a social
fabric. A radical right to housing must affirm
and protect this web of relations. It must
propose new links between housing and other
domains . . . the right to housing has to be
apprehended in a much broader context’
(Marcuse and Madden 2016, 145)
So while security of tenure is one of the most
important elements of the human right to
housing (Roisman 2013), if property is con-
sidered as a bundle of rights, one element of
this should be the right to dwell. Blandy
and Goodchild (1999) concur when they
argue that the notion of a bundle of rights is
‘the only interpretation that covers the situ-
ation of tenants, as well as those of owner-
occupiers’. This given, while property and
contract case law guides CPO processes,
equally important is the right of the tenant
or owner to a home and family life, albeit it
will be down to the courts to determine the
circumstances in which these rights take
precedence.
The right to housing is then a discourse
that potentially offers an eviscerated sense
of what is at stake in the London clearances.
As Baeten and Listerborn (2015) argue, the
‘right to dwell’ must be understood as a
right to inhabit the abstract space comprising
‘home’ in a wider sense. As Davidson (2009,
231) points out, drawing on Lefebvre and
Heidegger, the ‘right to dwell’ and the ‘right
to place’ can ‘be denigrated or destroyed
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even if one stays in a particular space’ (see
also Davidson and Lees 2010). In this sense,
displacement can occur even if a resident
gets to remain on their redeveloped estate
(e.g. if their home is refurbished and there is
infill new build development around them)
or if they get to move back to the footprint
of the estate into a newly-built community
(as per the vagaries of mixed communities
policy). A focus on preventing displacement
may not be enough to preserve their commu-
nity and the social, economic, cultural, and
psychological benefits that accrue to them
from dwelling within this particular place.
Imbroscio has developed this idea, proposing
that the ‘right to place’ is a fundamental right,
as important in democratic societies as the
right to movement:
‘People should have a right to live in the
place-communities (i.e. communities rooted
in geographic space, such as neighborhoods,
cities, towns, or regions) that they choose,
meaning that, above all, the preferences of
individuals should determine this question,
rather than a host of other factors standing
largely beyond their control. Such a right to
place would be constituted by a dual freedom,
entailing not only the ability to enter and exit
but also the ability to continue to live where
one currently resides. It thus entails the
freedom to go, and to go where one desires,
but it also entails the freedom to simply stay
put. Yet, while recognizing this dual freedom,
the right to place would not privilege the
freedom to stay put over the freedom of
prospective newcomers to enter, for to do so
would arbitrarily deny some full access to
their preferred place communities’
(Imbroscio 2004, 576)
Here, Imbroscio grapples, perhaps unsuc-
cessfully, with the fundamental ambivalence
of community as a concept, given it expresses
both a sense of exclusivity as much as radical
inclusivity. The key question is then whether
the law (in context) can provide the tools for
residents to remain within their community,
and prevent displacement, without impinging
on the rights of others to enter that commu-
nity, or for that community to change over
time via different processes (including regen-
eration). The right to place, as proposed by
Imbroscio, struggles to reconcile the need to
be inclusive (i.e. by allowing freedom of
entry) and its need to be somewhat exclusive
(to keep such entry from being destructive).
The difficulty in reconciling inclusivity and
exclusivity means that the right to place needs
to be translated into bespoke policies or
mechanisms that might allow for (some)
new residential development or incursion
whilst ensuring there is no increased ‘displa-
cement pressure’ bought to bear on long
term residents. According to Marcuse
(1985), the latter refers not only to actual dis-
placement but also to the anxieties, uncertain-
ties, insecurities and temporalities that
accompany any new development. One
important such mechanism is the community
land trust, which acquires and holds real
estate in the community’s interest. The CLT
has long been regarded as a de-commodified
alternative to gentrification (see Bunce, forth-
coming; Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008; LTF
et al. 2014; Steele, forthcoming), although
there are, to date, very few CLTs in
London (one example is the East London
Community Land Trust). Layard (forthcom-
ing) accordingly proposes that in addition to
efforts to keep land in collective or communal
ownership, planning restrictions (such as
limits on the construction of properties as
second homes or Air BnB properties) might
be used to try to protect distinctive places,
albeit taking into account Tait and Inch’s
(2016, 189) argument that ‘affective imageries
of place and community that seek to mobilise
the local are potentially powerful but deeply
ambiguous political constructs’.
Heeding Tait and Inch’s (2016) warning, it
is important to stress that community
remains a highly problematic concept, with
generations of urban sociologists and geo-
graphers questioning the extent to which
community can ever be synonymous with
neighbourhood (for a summary, see Blok-
land 2017). Inevitably, not all who dwell
on estates form affective ties with other
estate residents, and in many cases it is
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possible to talk about multiple communities
rather than a singular one. But the inherent
flexibility of the meaning of ‘community’,
combined with the fact that it is sometimes
regarded as spatially-bounded, means that
it is a powerful construct that can be mobi-
lised in legal struggles. Like many other
key concepts in planning and environmental
law—e.g. amenity, locality, purpose of use—
community is vaguely defined in a legal
sense (see Hubbard and Prior 2017 on plia-
bility in municipal law). Following the pre-
cedent set by the first Aylesbury CPO
Public Inquiry, where the planning inspector
put considerable weight on residents’ expec-
tation that they should remain in a situation
where they could maintain meaningful ties
with family and friends, it appears there is
now a basis for other resident groups fighting
eviction or dislocation to similarly invoke
their ‘right to community’—even if the scale
of the displacements involved are different.
This suggests an emerging alignment of plan-
ning/environmental law with human rights
/equalities law that provides multiple oppor-
tunities to align state power with what
Delaney (2016, 269) terms ‘vectors of justice’
in the battle against gentrification and
displacement.
Conclusion
In England and Wales, the Housing Act 1966
exists to ensure that every eligible citizen is
provided with ‘suitable’ accommodation,
but as the compulsory purchase of properties
on council estates across London suggests,
this right to suitable housing seldom equates
to a right to remain within a suitable living
environment. It is here that the 2016 CPO
public inquiry victory for Aylesbury resi-
dents and their supporters is particularly sig-
nificant, as it considers the loss of place rather
than the loss of housing per se, and recognises
the legal right to dwell as one that might be
invoked in instances where a given ‘commu-
nity’ is under threat (see also Darcy and
Rogers 2014; Davidson 2009). It suggests
that while it might sometimes be necessary
for residents fighting displacement to seek
extra-legal solutions via direct action and
‘improper politics’ (see Watt 2009), there is
significant room for those seeking spatial
justice to invoke the language of rights to
impose enforceable obligations on London
boroughs to protect those spaces and popu-
lations under threat of displacement. Given
the DCLG’s avowed intention to give local
residents new rights in terms of how planning
decisions are made16, to bid to buy commu-
nity buildings and facilities that are important
to them, and to run a local authority service
where they believe they can do so differently
and better, this may well be an opportune
time for council estate residents in
London—and other British cities—to assert
their legal ‘right to community’ in their
fight to stay put.
Our conclusion challenges the idea that the
right to the city should be envisaged only as
an embodied and social form of resistance
rather than an institutionalised set of legal
norms and practices. Following Lefebvre,
many commentators on struggles against dis-
placement have highlighted the potential of
‘differential spaces’ for challenging dominant
socio-spatial orders via practices of habiting
(i.e. occupying and producing space). We
are not so naı¨ve as to suggest that the law
will always provide a viable alternative to
this, nor that the legal institutionalisation of
the ‘right to community’ will allow all vul-
nerable or working class populations to effec-
tively oppose enforced displacement. Yet the
counter position—that the law exists only to
support the interests of the state, and that it
will inevitably be used to support state-spon-
sored strategies of gentrification—is also
untenable (see also Butler 2012; Cooper
2016). Taking a pluralistic perspective on
the law as a realm of competing interests,
ideologies, and capacities (Delaney 2016),
we conclude that there is a need to think crea-
tively about the ways that legal procedures,
institutions and resources can work against,
rather than in favour, of the politics of
gentrification.
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To date the literatures on ‘the right to the
city’ and even on ‘legal geographies’ have
been curiously placeless. They sometimes
talk about law and rights in quite abstract
and universalising ways (Glass, Woldoff,
and Morrison 2014). But ‘rights’ are very
different in, for example, England and
Wales (which have no written constitution)
than in the US (which does). And both
these common law jurisdictions have differ-
ent legal cultures compared with codified
civil law countries. For example, England
and Wales does not generally do codification,
allowing case law and legal precedent, rather
than detailed codes, to shape how law is inter-
preted. It is this in fact that makes ‘precedent’
meaningful in the Aylesbury case; in France
or Italy subsequent rulings would not be
bound by precedent as they are in English
common law. There are also grounds for
tenants to defend their claims in terms of
administrative law constraints on govern-
ment actions (which must be reasonable and
proportionate), but strictly speaking these
are not ‘rights’. As critical urbanists we
need to be careful not to confuse administra-
tive law claims about due process with a
‘right’ to anything. As the Aylesbury case
shows there are also claims made on the
basis of statutory duties on the state, for
example, the legal duty on councils imposed
by the 1966 Housing Act or public sector
equalities duties associated with the 2010
Equality Act. This suggests there needs to
be more care and attention paid to the differ-
ent ways in which the jurisdictional context
shapes opportunities for claims-making in
courts and for much tighter use of the term
‘rights’—which is often used too loosely by
geographers (and perhaps by activists also).
This failure to understand the place-speci-
ficity of the law means those resisting displa-
cement are sometimes unable to formulate
their legal claims in ways that will have trac-
tion. It also cuts against the grain of the
fashion in geography and critical urban
studies, where there is a tendency to universa-
lise about the ‘right to the city’ without much
sense of legal context. Hartman and
Robinson (2003, 474–480), for example,
note the US does not recognise the basic
right to housing, with significant differences
in US and European legal systems and
courts17. The ‘right to the city’ discourse is
often too abstract and insensitive to geo-
graphic context to offer much practical gui-
dance on the ways forward. We need a
much more particular and necessarily
grounded way forward that is attentive to
context and the different avenues for claims-
making which may be about human rights,
the fairness of administrative procedures, or
the legal duties of housing and service provi-
ders. To that end this paper is a call for more
attention to be paid to the legal geographies
of gentrification and displacement, for as
Hartman and Robinson (2003, 485) assert:
‘tenants represented by counsel are far less
likely to be evicted’.
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Notes
1 This figure is based on the authors’ own research (PI:
Lees, L., CoIs: Hubbard, P. and Tate, N. ESRC
2017–2020. Gentrification, Displacement, and the
Impacts of Council Estate Renewal in C21st London
[ES/N015053\1]), involving Freedom of
Information (FOI) requests to London boroughs
coupled with use of borough planning records. This
figure may itself be an underestimate given there is
no centralised database of council assets including
those disposed of via stock transfer since 1997.
2 See also https://theconversation.com/camerons-
sink-estate-strategy-comes-at-a-human-cost-53358
3 A CPO with no objections is likely to be confirmed
within a few months of it being made, one with
objections can take 18 to 24 months. Under Section
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17 of the Housing Act 1985 existing housing can be
compulsorily acquired to provide new housing;
under section 226(1)(a) of the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990 property can be compulsorily
acquired to secure its redevelopment if this will bring
social, economic or environmental benefits.
4 R (on the application of Neptune Wharf Ltd) v
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] 2
P&CR 20; Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry [2007] EWHC 1013; Sole v Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1527.
In all cases judgments were informed by ODPM
Circular 06/2004 which states that ‘An acquiring
authority should be sure that the purposes for which
it is making a compulsory purchase order sufficiently
justify interfering with the human rights of those with
an interest in land affected. Regard should be had in
particular to provisions of Article 1 of the first
protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights and, in the case of a dwelling, Article 8 of the
Convention’.
5 The term ‘brownfield estate’ was first used in a
report by estate agents Savills in April 2014 under
the title Regeneration and Intensification of Housing
Supply on Local Authority Housing Estates in
London. In January 2016, Savills submitted their
research report to the Cabinet Office, Completing
London’s Streets: How the regeneration and
intensification of housing estates could increase
London’s supply of homes and benefit residents. In it
they estimate that London has around 8,500
hectares of land currently occupied by local
authority estates, and containing around 660,000
households. Of these, they recommend that 1,750
hectares be regenerated according to what they call
their ‘Complete Streets’ model.
6 There is however a statutory requirement for tenants
to be consulted when the case for demolition is
made by a local authority—see Douglas and Parkes
(2016).
7 These included the original architect of the Heygate
Estate, Tim Tinker, as well as several academics
including Michael Edwards, UCL-Bartlett; Loretta
Lees, then at King’s College London; Mara Ferreri,
then at Queen Mary University of London; and Paul
McGann, London Metropolitan University.
8 ALAG was supported by a handful of academics
(Loretta Lees, now at Leicester University, plus
architectural historians Ben Campkin and Jane
Rendell, and engineering scientist Kate Crawford all
at UCL), housing activists (including the 35%
Campaign group), an ex-Conservative councillor,
and eventually, on the last day, a pro bono lawyer
(see Ferreri and Glucksberg 2016).
9 In relation to the latter, the Court accepted that a
CPO should not be confirmed unless the case in the
public interest fairly reflects the necessary element of
balance required in the application of Article 8 and
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (London
Borough of Bexley and Sainsbury’s v SoSE [2001]
EWHC Admin 323, paragraphs 33-48 and Pascoe
[2006] EWHC paragraph 66).
10 CPO Report to the Secretary of State for
Communities and Local Government 29 January
2016 by Leslie Coffey on Application for the
Confirmation of the London Borough of Southwark
(Aylesbury Estate Site 1B-1C) Compulsory
Purchase Order 2014 NPCU/CPO/A5840/
74092.
11 This initial ruling was, however, withdrawn in May
2017 (conceded by the Secretary of State due to a
lack of logic) and a revised public inquiry is taking
place in January and April 2018.
12 This was also a decisive factor in R (Harris) v London
Borough of Haringey (Court of Appeal, 5 May
2010) where the court held that the council, when
granting planning permission, failed to discharge
its duties under section 71(1) of the Race Relations
Act 1976 (now replaced by the Equality Act 2020
Public Sector Equality Duty) in terms of considering
the potential effects of the scheme on Latin
American traders or loss of housing by ethnic
minorities (see Ricketts 2016).
13 Letter to Karen Jones, Southwark Council, from
Dave Jones, Senior Planner, on behalf of the
Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government, 16 September 2016, Ref: NPCU/
CPO/A5840/74092
14 The GLA (2016) Draft Good Practice Guide to
Estate Regeneration emphasises this ‘right to
return’, with the document suggesting that residents
should always able to return to the communities they
came from once estate redevelopment has been
completed. However, while this guidance argues
that this right to return should involve access to a
suitable home, it is not clear who determines what a
suitable home might be, or if the offer to tenants is
‘reasonable’.
15 In the Savoury v Secretary of State for Wales
(1976), tenants subjected to a CPO made a formal
request to be rehoused in a new locality together,
arguing that keeping the same neighbours
constituted suitable accommodation. The Secretary
of State for Wales ultimately offered half the tenants
new homes in the same area, arguing that collective
rehousing for all was unattainable. The definition of
suitability therefore rests on the individual needs of
tenants, rather than collective ones.
16 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
2010-to-2015-government-policy-localism/2010-
to-2015-government-policy-localism
17 On housing rights see: https://www.equalityhuman
rights.com/sites/default/files/human_rights_at_
home.pdf and on social housing see https://www.
equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-
guidance/guidance-social-housing-providers.
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